April 23, 2018

Explosives Company That Emitted 6 Tons Of Ammonia Near St. Helens Pleads Guilty

Explosives Company That Emitted 6 Tons Of Ammonia Near St. Helens Pleads Guilty: An explosives manufacturing company pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court Friday for failing to notify authorities of the release of 13,000 pounds of ammonia into the air at its St. Helens plant.

April 14, 2018

Are you doing your asset inspections properly?

The final inquiry report for an incident where smoke was observed in the passenger cabin of a flight in India has pinpointed lapses by the airliner in carrying out inspection on power turbine blades, as the probable reason behind the incident. The report mentions the following:
“Immediately after takeoff, at an altitude of about 4,500 feet, a master caution warning was triggered. The crew looked up the readings on the panels, checked all operating parameters and since everything looked normal, they continued with the ascent.
However, after reaching a height of around 6,000 feet, the crew got a call from the cabin crew in-charge about smoke inside the passenger cabin. Passengers were immediately given wet tissues and asked to go in for protective breathing system over the Public Address System.
The aircraft had a valid certificate of airworthiness and the maintenance schedule was adhered to. However, the Eddy Current Testing (inspection of thin metal for potential safety issues) later incorporated into the Engine Maintenance Manual was not carried out, the report pointed out.
The probable cause of the smoke in cabin was contamination of bleed air by engine oil due to failure of the air/oil seals of turbine shaft bearings and impeller bearings.”

March 18, 2018

Ghosts of Bhopal?

In a CSB investigation report about a Nitrous oxide explosion in 2016 that killed an employee, the following causes were listed in the report. Many of the causes identified by the CSB are identical to the causes of the Bhopal gas disaster in 1984. Can you identify some of them?
 1.    XXXXXX did not evaluate inherently safer design options that could have eliminated the need for the pump;
 2.    XXXXXX never evaluated its process to identify and control process safety hazards;
3.    XXXXXX did not effectively apply the hierarchy of controls to the safeguards that the company used to prevent a possible nitrous oxide explosion;
4.    XXXXXX installed equipment that increased the likelihood of an explosion without performing a management of change safety review;
5.    XXXXXX did not apply an essential industry safety instrumentation standard, or key elements of a voluntary safe storage and handling standard, both of which are intended to prevent nitrous oxide explosions;
6.    XXXXXX safeguards that failed to prevent the explosion include an automatic shutdown safety control and an explosion prevention device;
 7.    The automatic shutdown safety control XXXXXX relied on required the XXXXXX worker to be physically present – and located immediately adjacent to the trailer truck – in order to bypass the shutdown at a time when an explosion was most likely to occur; and
8.    The XXXXXX explosion prevention device – a flame arrestor – was never tested or inspected to ensure it could protect workers from an explosion.
 9.    XXXXXX failed to apply lessons from previous nitrous oxide explosions; and
10. XXXXXX did not provide its Cantonment facility with an appropriate level of technical staffing support.

March 15, 2018

PGS 29: New risk-based Dutch regulations for storage terminals

PGS 29: New risk-based Dutch regulations for storage terminals: Alwin van Aggelen, CEO of A-Risc, explains how terminals can deal with new scenario analyses and risk assessment requirements for PGS 29